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KONSERVATISME DALAM PENDAPATAN DAN PENILAIAN ASET:
KESAN REFORMASI DALAM PERATURAN DAN BUDAYA
PERSEKITARAN INSTITUSI DI MALAYSIA
ABSTRAK
Baru-baru ini, dua pembaharuan pengawalseliaan yang penting yang dimulakan oleh
pengawal selia di Malaysia untuk meningkatkan kualiti pelaporan kewangan di
kalangan syarikat-syarikat senaraian awam iaitu penguatkuasaan IFRS pada tahun
2006 dan pindaan kepada Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia (MCCG) pada tahun
2007. . Walaupun begitu, kredibiliti peraturan-peraturan ini masih dipersoalkan oleh
pihak-pihak berkepentingan awam dan pelbagai syarikat oleh kerana kegagalan
pentadbiran beberapa syarikat baru-baru ini. Bagi merungkai persoalan ini, tesis ini
telah dijalankan untuk meneliti kesan sebelum dan selepas daripada peraturan
reformasi yang baru tersebut ke atas ketelusan laporan kewangan (dinilai dari segi
tahap ‘konservatisme’ syarikat). Analisis lanjut dilakukan dengan menyiasat kesan
budaya dalam persekitaran institusi di Malaysia yang diwakili oleh hubungan politik,
kekeluargaan, golongan elit dan kepelbagaian etnik di kalangan pengarah syarikat ke
atas hubungan antara IFRS dan MCCG 2007 pada konservatif .
Dalam kajian ini kami menggunakan dua jenis ukuran konservatif iaitu konservatif
syarikat dalampendapatan (earnings conservatism) menggunakan model Basu
(1997dan konservatif syarikat dalam pengiraan asset (balance sheet conservatism)
menggunakan model Lara (2004). Konservatisme syarikat dalam pendapatan
(earnings conservatism) dianggap sebagai langkah terbaik bagi mengukur ketelusan
pelaporan kewangan kerana konsep ini tahap pengesahan yang lebih tinggi untuk
keuntungan berbanding kerugian berdasarkan berita dari harga saham manakala
xv
konservatif syarikat dalam pengiraan asset (balance sheet conservatism) digunakan
sebagai kualiti laporan kewangan yang rendah kerana ia semata-mata mengecilkan
keuntungan dan terlalu menekankan kerugian tanpa sebarang justifikasi. Kami
menjangkakan bahawa konservatisme syarikat dalam pendapatan akan meningkat
selepas perubahan peraturan tersebut manakala konservatif syarikat dalam pengiraan
asset akan menurun selepas penguatkuasaan IFRS dan MCCG 2007. Selain itu, kami
juga menjangkakan bahawa konservatif dalam pendapatan semakin berkurangan dan
konservatif dalam pengiraan asset meningkat walaupun selepas IFRS dan MCCG
kesan daripada budaya institusi Malaysia.
Berdasarkan sampel akhir 3,083 pemerhatian daripada syarikat-syarikat yang
tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 2004 hingga 2009, kami mendapati bahawa
konservatif syarikat dalam pendapatan meningkat konservatif syarikat dalam
pengiraan asset menurun selepas IFRS dan MCCG.Terdapat pelbagai penemuan bagi
kesan kesan budaya dalam persekitaran institusi di Malaysia ke atas kualiti laporan
kewangan. Analisis mendapati hubungan politik syarikat tidak mempengaruhi
konservatisme syarikat; sama ada dalam pendapatan atau pengiraan aset. Analisis
juga mendapati bahawa konservatif pendapatan bagi firma yang mempunyai
hubungan kekeluargaan di kalangan pengarah meningkat selepas IFRS dan MCCG
2007 menunjukkan bahawa firma keluarga mempunyai insentif yang kurang untuk
memanipulasi laporan kewangann kerana mereka mempunyai kepentingan jangka
panjang dengan firma. Keputusan analisa bagi kesan kewujudan lelaki terkaya
(golongan elit) di kalangan lembaga pengarah syarikat membuktikan bahawa
hubungan firma dengan golongan elit ini membawa kepada kualiti laporan kewangan
yang rendah setelah keputusan menunjukkan bahawa konservatif syarikat dalam
xvi
pengiraan asset meningkat selepas IFRS. Analisa juga mendapati bahawa kualiti
laporan kewangan tidak ditentukan oleh etnik semata-mata.
Kajian ini memberi gambaran kepada pengawal selia undang-undang untuk
merumuskan dasar perakaunan yang akan mengambil kira budaya institusi di
Malaysia. Ini kerana sebahagian daripada budaya i Negara ini mungkin member
kesan kepada kualiti laporan kewangan di negara ini. Oleh kerana literatur tentang
konservatif syarikat dalam pengiraan aset adalah terhad, kajian ini secara tidak
langsung meningkatkan literatur tentang konservatif syarikat dalam pengiraan aset
dan dengan itu meningkatkan pemahaman mengenai peranan konservatif dalam
ketelusan laporan kewangan di negara ini.
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EARNING AND BALANCE SHEET CONSERVATISM IN MALAYSIA: THE
INFLUENCE OF IFRS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE IN MALAYSIA
ABSTRACT
Recently, two important regulatory reforms initiated by the regulators in Malaysia to
enhance financial reporting quality among the public listed companies which are the
enforcement of IFRS in 2006 and the amendment of Malaysian Code of Corporate
Governance (MCCG) in 2007. In spite of the regulative reform, the credibility of
these regulations is still questioned by the public and various stakeholders of the
companies due to recent corporate failures. Stimulated by this dilemma, this thesis
examines the pre and post effects of IFRS enforcement in 2006 and the amendment
of MCCG in 2007 on financial reporting transparency measured by conservatism.
Further analysis is done by investigating the effect of Malaysia’s institutional culture
proxied by political connection, family connection, richest men connection and
ethnicity on the relationship between IFRS and MCCG 2007 on conservatism.
In this study we use two proxies of conservatism which are earnings conservatism
using Basu (1997)’s model and balance sheet conservatism using Lara (2004)’s
model. Earnings conservatism is used as the best measure of financial reporting
transparency as this concept requires a higher degree of verifications for profits
compared to losses based on the news from stock prices whereas balance sheet
conservatism is used as a poor financial reporting quality as it merely understate
profits and overstate losses without any indications. It is hypothesized that earnings
conservatism increases whereas balance sheet conservatism decrease after the IFRS
and MCCG 2007. We also hypothesized that earnings conservatism is decreasing
xviii
and balance sheet conservatism increasing even after the IFRS and MCCG as a result
of Malaysia’s institutional culture.
Based on a final sample of 3,083 observations from listed companies on Bursa
Malaysia from year 2004 till 2009, it was found that earnings conservatism is
enhanced after IFRS and MCCG whereas poor financial reporting quality (balance
sheet conservatism) is also reduced after IFRS and MCCG. There was mixed
findings for results on institutional culture. Politically connected firms are not
conservative; either in earnings or balance sheet conservatism. Enhanced earnings
conservatism after IFRS and MCCG 2007 provided evidence that family firms have
less incentive to manage earnings since they have long interest with the firms. The
results for richest men provided evidence that richest men connection lead to poor
financial reporting quality as balance sheet conservatism is enhanced after IFRS. In
addition, it was found that conservatism is not depend on ethnicity per se.
The study provide insight to the regulators to formulate accounting policies that will
take into consideration Malaysia’s institutional culture as some of the culture might
trigger financial reporting quality in this country. Since the literatures on balance
sheet conservatism are scarce, this study also extends the literature on balance sheet
conservatism and thus enhances the understanding on the role of conservatism in
financial reporting transparency.
1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the background of the study, followed by problem statement,
research questions and research objectives. Then this chapter discusses the
contribution of this study and lastly, this chapter presents the organizations of this
study.
1.2 Background of the study
The quality of financial reporting has been the topic of discussion by many parties
such as regulators, governments, creditors, shareholders and managers. The subject
has become an important issue for financial users, especially investors and creditors,
as both of them have claims against the firms’ resources. For investors and creditors,
they have to ensure that whatever amount invested into the firms will be rewarded
and paid off in the form of dividend and money lent respectively. Therefore,
financial reporting not only acts as a tool for firms to demonstrate their performance,
but it goes beyond that by becoming one of the instruments and medium to monitor
and control their behavior.
The issue of financial reporting quality has become more prominent due to recent
corporate failures that occurred in developed countries, such as the United States of
America, where rules and regulations are more stringent and rigid compared to other
countries. The collapse of Enron and WorldCom have drawn the attention of
regulators, practitioners, auditors and researchers, both in developed and developing
countries, to the issue of financial reporting transparency. These cases have shattered
the whole nation, particularly the companies’ shareholders, as the financial reporting
2of the companies were ‘decorated’ with promising profits, lower debts and high
revenues.
Levitt (1998) defines quality as financial reporting transparency that signifies the
basis of any business.1 He further states that success of capital markets is explicitly
dependent on the accounting and disclosure system where high-quality accounting
standards will produce financial statements that report events in real-time. High-
quality financial reporting ensures no added reserves and deferral of losses, and
actual volatility is not smoothed away to portray a false representation of steady and
consistent growth. In financial reporting, the issue of corporate transparency is more
important as information that is accurate and relevant is needed by investors in their
investment decision making and at the same time to ensure the security of their
investments. Regulators are also demanding corporate transparency in order to exert
more control on company operations and the behaviour of managers.
Numerous tools have been introduced by researchers, such as discretionary accruals,
earnings persistence, earnings smoothness and stock market reactions, to measure the
quality of financial reporting. In spite of that, Dechow, Ge & Schrand (2010) in their
review of earnings quality measurement, stress that measures of earnings quality are
measuring different constructs. A particular determinant of earnings quality is not
associated with the measurements of earnings quality and each of them has different
consequences. Therefore, they conclude that there are no single best measures of
earnings quality as each of them have their own strengths and weaknesses based on
their constructs.
1 Arthur Levitt is the former Securities Exchange Commissions (SEC) in U.S.
3Following the definition of quality as proposed by Levitt (1998), conservatism is
regarded as the best measure for financial reporting transparency as this concept
requires a higher level of verification in distinguishing between the good and the bad
news. In this concept bad news is recognized earlier than good news and therefore
earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. This means bad news is
identified sooner than good news, thus, earnings reflects bad news faster than good
ones. Francis, Lafond, Olsson & Schipper (2004) and Vichitsarawong, Eng & Meek
(2010) use conservatism as a measure of financial reporting transparency since
conservatism is regarded as a desirable attributes of accounting earnings that can be
used in order to avoid unexpected economic downturn and corporate failure.
The concept of conservatism has dominated other accounting principles including
historical cost and realization conventions for centuries (Basu, 1997). Accordingly,
conservatism can be categorised into two types: earnings conservatism and balance
sheet conservatism. Basu (1997) defined earnings conservatism as the tendency to
recognize bad news than good news in a timelier manner and this tendency is
measured with slope coefficients from regressions of earnings on returns (Basu,
1997). On the other hand, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define balance sheet
conservatism as ‘the existence of a persistent understatement of the book value figure
with respect to market’s valuation of the firm’.
Prior literatures (Black & White, 2003;Gassen, Fulbier, & Sellhorn, 2006; Joos &
Lang, 1994) support that earnings conservatism is more apparent in common-law
countries where financial reporting quality is higher compared to code-law countries.
Earnings conservatism is regarded as having higher financial reporting quality
compared to balance sheet conservatism as it has a significant role in reducing
4organizations’ problems and curbing deadweight losses from poor investment
decisions. Watts (2003)argues that earnings conservatism reduces managers’ ability
and incentives to overstate earnings and net assets by requiring higher verification
standards for gain recognition and reduces managers’ ability to withhold information
on expected losses. Conservatism also serves a monitoring role on firms’ investment
policies. It also helps to identify negative net present value (NPV) projects or poorly
performing investments by requiring more timely recognition of economic (or
expected) losses. This, in turn, signals to the companies’ board of directors to
investigate both the project and the managers. Thus, deadweight losses from poor
investment decisions can be reduced and firm and equity values can be increased.
Nonetheless, according to Ball & Shivakumar (2005), balance sheet conservatism is
less effective in contracting role as it causes randomness in decisions derived from
financial information. In addition, balance sheet conservatism reduces the
opportunities of firms to account value in a conditionally conservative fashion by
understating the book value of assets compared to the market value. Gassenet
al.(2006) state that balance sheet conservatism causes ‘cookie-jar reserves’ to be
created which may lead to earnings management.2Therefore, balance sheet is more
apparent in code law countries in which debt financing systems depend very much on
internal funds, ownership structures are more concentrated, less shareholder
activism, low legal enforcement and taxation policies that rely more on the lower
value of assets.
Even though earnings conservatism has also been criticized by many researchers as
being less predictable (Chan, Lin, & Strong, 2009; Penman & Zhang, 2002), less
2Cookie jar reserves are an accounting practice in which a company uses generous reserves from good
years against losses that might be incurred in bad years.
5informative for firms with high growth (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and may lead to
higher opportunistic behaviour (Beekes, Pope, & Young, 2004), due to its
governance and informational role, earnings conservatism is still the most suitable
proxy for transparency. The concept of earnings conservatism embraces several
behavioural aspects which can educate managers to be more ethical and accountable
on whatever actions that have been taken. The behavioural aspects which are being
cautious and alert can inculcate a sense of responsibility and caution among
managers as they are controlled by people who are also their stakeholders.
This concept has also been argued as leading to manipulation. Despite that, it is
argued that such manipulation can only occur if managers practice excessive
conservatism. Watts (2003) questions the practice of excessive conservative
reporting as being a potential cause for the distortion of earnings-returns relation.
This practice has also been rejected in FRS18 (Disclosure of Accounting Policies) as
it requires the companies to adopt accounting policies appropriately according to its
circumstances so as to provide a ‘true and fair view’ of financial statements
(Accounting Standards Board, 2000). Rationally, conservatism is regarded as a proxy
for transparency due to the natural behaviour of humans who are more devoted to
profits and thus tend to present good news more than bad news, particularly in
matters concerning money and businesses. It is hard for an individual to disclose
information which may impede their wealth especially in capitalist economies.
Due to its role and its transparency nature, the concept of earnings conservatism has
been used by many researchers as a proxy of financial reporting quality (Ahmed &
Duellman, 2007 Basu, 1997; Lara & Mora, 2004; Lara, Osma &Penalva, 2009a;
Lara, Osma & Penalva, 2009b; Vichitsarawong et al., 2010). Conservatism has been
6linked with factors that contribute to financial reporting quality. Factors such as
corporate governance, ownership structure, financial reporting standards and
Securities Commission Act have long been debated as the main factors that
contribute to the financial reporting quality and these factors become the main
concern of regulators.
The role of regulators is considered as the most important to ensure that the firms are
aware of their responsibilities in protecting the interest of all their stakeholders.
Regulation is seen as an additional control mechanism to discipline managers to act
in the best interests of the investors. Even though auditors are appointed as the main
intermediary between financial users and firms in controlling the behaviour of
managers, the role of auditors itself are also subject to the regulators to monitor and
ensure that they act on behalf of the stakeholders. Thus, regulators act as the
‘controller’ of the whole business relationship to maintain a fair and orderly capital
market and this effect will be translated into a better financial reporting quality.
Previous studies have shown that there is a strong relationship between conservatism
and regulation as they found a positive relationship between corporate governance
and conservatism (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Beekes et al., 2004), IFRS and
conservatism (Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Gassen et al., 2006; Lara, Torres, &
Veira, 2008) and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and conservatism (Lobo & Zhou, 2006;
Rezaee & Jain, 2004).3 Previous studies also found that there is a strong relationship
between institutional factors or a country’s culture and conservatism. Ball, Kothari &
Robin (2000) and Ball, Robin & Shuang Wu (2003) examine the degree of political
influence proxied by code- or common-law countries and conservatism and found
3SOX is an accounting standards set by U.S. federal law for all U.S. public company boards,
management and public accounting firms
7that conservatism is greater in common-law countries as they have better
enforcement on regulations. Chan et al.(2009) investigate the effects of family firms
on conservatism and Doupnik, Gotti, Kang &Salter (2010) investigate the effects of
culture identified by Schwartz (1994) on conservatism. Both studies concluded that
culture does play a role in accounting practices.
However, the above studies investigated the relationship between conservatism on
specific regulations or culture. A study by Bushman & Piotroski (2006) investigated
the effects of regulation and other institutional factors, such as political connection,
on conservatism. Additionally, Bushman &Piotroski (2006) examine the effect of
country-level institutions such as legal or judicial systems, securities law, tax regime
and political economy of 38 countries on conservatism. However, the study did not
investigate how these two factors (regulation and culture) interact with each other
and affect conservatism. It only investigated the effect of these two factors on
earnings conservatism. Furthermore, the investigation, which was done in 38
countries, may not capture specifically the differences of culture in those countries
which might have important interpretation to the results.
Another study that examines the effect of regulation and institutional culture which is
political connection is a study by Mohammed, Ahmed & Ji (2011) which was also
done in Malaysia. Mohammed et al.(2011) examine the effect of corporate
governance and political connection on earnings conservatism in Malaysia measured
using Basu (1997)’s model. This study differs from Mohammed et al. (2011) in a
number of important aspects. Firstly, Mohammed et al. (2011) investigate the effect
of corporate governance variables implemented using the Anglo-Saxon model of
corporate governance in the Malaysian market while this study takes the current
8changes of corporate governance code as it investigates the effect of corporate
governance code amendment implemented in 2007 on conservatism. The purpose of
using the amended code is to analyze the effect of current changes and, thus,
contribute to the reviewing and revision of those changes by the regulators for the
purpose of regulation enhancement. Even though some of the corporate governance
variables used are quite similar, some of the variables that differ highlight the
important changes in Malaysia which has never been tested its effect on
conservatism, such as audit committee meetings. Thus, it is imperative to stress that
the new amended code of corporate governance in 2007 emphasizes on the
importance of communication between board of directors and audit committee.
Secondly, Mohammed et al. (2011) utilise only a single measure of conservatism
which is earnings conservatism measured by using Basu’s (1997) model, while this
study uses two different measures of conservatism which are earnings and balance
sheet conservatismmeasured by using a valuation framework provided by Feltham
&Ohlson (1995). Previous literatures have documented that earnings conservatism is
apparent in common-law countries, while balance sheet conservatism is more evident
in code-law countries. Thus, it is also imperative to stress that the use of balance
sheet conservatism in Malaysian context is highly relevant due to its institutional
background. Principally, Malaysia uses International Accounting Standards (IAS)
adopted common-law countries such as the US and UK which have been known as
having high quality of financial reporting. Nevertheless, primarily, accounting
practices in Malaysia are highly influenced by its institutional culture similar to the
code-law countries’ such as political connection and family firms. Therefore,
investigating the effect of regulations like IFRS and corporate governance on both
9types of conservatism is interesting as the influence of code- and common-law
countries prevails in Malaysia’s institutional setting.
Thirdly, this study provides a detailed explanation on the attributes of conservatism
as a proxy for financial reporting quality and explains in detail the reason why
managers should practice conservatism. This study extends the current literatures of
conservatism by focusing on various mechanisms of regulation which are IFRS and
corporate governance and take into consideration other factors that may mitigate
such regulations. Instead of testing the direct relationship as Mohammed et al.
(2011), this study puts the two factors, which are regulation and culture, in a more
complex relationship and sees how the two factors interact with each other in one
institutional setting. The variables used for culture in this study are also more
comprehensive as those variables are chosen based on the institutional background of
Malaysia.
Hence, this study is brought about by these factors. The collapse of global financial
markets in September 2008 has detonated a debate on what are the causes of this
global financial crisis. The crisis has also been attributed to, among other things, a
perceived lack of transparency in the financial markets. In addition, the Secretary
General of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
Angel Gurría, commented on his view that one the factors to be blamed for the crisis
is poor corporate governance. Lack of enforcement of corporate governance has
allowed the transparency, accountability and integrity of companies to be
compromised and eventually may lead to corruption (Kousenidis, Ladas, & Negakis,
2009). In 2008, the US experienced one of the worst economic crises in two decades,
including failures in its subprime market leading to housing foreclosures, and a
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complete dissolution of its banking and financial system. The US and other European
governments have stepped in to bail out companies experiencing huge losses, whilst
the stock markets worldwide have dropped to dangerous levels. This also includes
the Asian markets in which Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and
Malaysia have and will continue to experience its shock.
Previously, Malaysia was hit by financial crisis in 1997. The crisis caused the Bursa
Malaysia index to drop, the gross domestic product index fell, high volatility in the
value of the Ringgit and the number of non-performing loans escalated.
Consequently, Malaysia introduced the corporate governance code and more
importantly, set up task force agencies such as Danaharta and Danamodal which
successfully steered the country out of the 1997 economic crisis. These factors
ensured the impact on Malaysia was not as much as on other markets when the recent
2008/2009 global financial crisis hit the world (Lim & Kanesalingam, 2010).
Therefore, this study is seen as an interesting enquiry to investigate whether the
enforcement of IFRS in 2006 and the amendment of code of corporate governance in
2007 have successfully increase conservatism in Malaysia and give input to
regulators to improve regulatory system in the country.
Secondly, recent corporate failures that occurred all over the world have called into
attention the revamp of regulation systems. The 2008 financial crisis led political
transformations in many Asian countries which, in turn, exposed fundamental
weaknesses in both the financial and political systems and thus, orchestrated the
failures in policy, regulations, oversight, and enforcement mechanisms. High profile
cases of corporate mismanagement or employee misconduct from Siemens in
Germany and UBS in Switzerland to IBM in Argentina and Samsung in South Korea
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had demonstrated what can happen when the principles of corporate governance
(transparency, accountability and integrity) are absent, inadequate or abused.
Corporations fail to realize the potential benefit of corporate governance, hence, their
corporations still collapse even with the existence of good corporate governance
system. Most of the large corporations carried out corporate lobbying and financing
of political activities to assist them in understanding, tracking and shaping the
development of regulations and legislations. When performed with integrity and
transparency by a company, these activities can be legitimate and lead to positive
impact. However, large funds that are available at the disposal of businesses and the
close relationship that exists between companies and lawmakers can lead to undue
and unfair influence on a country’s policies and politics (Transparency International
(TI), 2009a).
In Malaysia, for example, a high profile case of a government-owned company
which is under Khazanah Nasional Berhad has made the role of government and
regulations in Malaysia questionable. Those cases have opened the eyes of many
professionals to look forward into the cases and have also promoted shareholder
activism in Malaysia. Sime Darby and Pos Malaysia has incurred losses over RM1
billion and RM546 million respectively due to overrun cost in big investment
(Ismail, 2010; News Straits Times, 2010). According to Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) 2009 produced by Transparency International (TI), the CPI score for
Malaysia has declined from 5.1 in 2008 to 4.5 in 2009 (Transparency International
(TI), 2009b). This can be attributed to theperception that not much progress has been
made to combat corruption and the lack of political will toimplement effective anti-
corruption measures. TI suggests that the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
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(MACC)seems to target “small fish” and opposition politicians (Transparency
International (TI), 2009a) in its fight against corruption in Malaysia.
Thirdly, as the Group of 20 (G-20) set 2012 as the current deadline for financial
system reformation, years before, 2012 is regarded as an important date to pursue
regulation reformation in order to ensure that loopholes in the current financial
systems are closed to prevent illicit financial flows and corporate transparency is
promoted in a more systematic manner. Malaysia, as well, will adopt full
convergence of IFRS in 2012. Therefore, this study is regarded as an initial effort to
explore the effect of institutional environment in improving corporate disclosure and
transparency as Fan & Wong (2002) state that the implementation of international
accounting standards and disclosure rules without considering the institutional
environment in East Asia will not improve corporate transparency in this region.
Transparency International (TI) organization in its recommendation states that
“efforts towards better financial regulation remain uneven.4 Enhanced regulation and
oversight has to be accompanied by full transparency through public reporting of
findings of all oversight institutions” (Transparency International, 2009c).
1.3 Problem Statement
The role of regulators in Malaysia is to ensure a balanced development of vibrant
markets through innovation leading to growth, while at the same time, they have to
ensure that the market is properly regulated. There is a call for regulators to
determine their direction in the regulation of capital markets. They have to ensure
that whatever directions or steps taken, it will enhance the quality of financial
reporting as financial reporting acts as a medium for stakeholders to monitor firm’s
4TI is a non-governmental organization that monitors and publicizes corporate and political corruption
in international development
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performance and behaviour. At the same time, they have to face challenges to
enforce regulations due to the institutional setting factors such as government
intervention in standard setting and business operations and lower shareholder
activism among the stakeholders that lead to lower demand of financial reporting
quality.
In Malaysia, several reforms have been done by the regulators such as Securities
Commission, Bursa Malaysia, Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG),
Malaysia Accounting Standards Board (MASB) to ensure quality financial reporting
by the listed companies. For example, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance
(MCCG) has been formulated in 2000 and revised in 2007 as a continuous joint
effort between the government and the industry to strengthen the board of directors
and audit committees and to ensure they carry out their roles and responsibilities
accordingly. MSWG was established in 1999 in order to protect minority
shareholders’ interest and to stimulate shareholder activism among them. MASB has
made a lot of effort such as to converge local accounting standards with International
Accounting Standards (IAS) gradually in order to provide a platform for the
Malaysian PLCs to understand the standards and to look forward to its
implementation in enhancing financial reporting quality and comparability.
Nevertheless, the credibility of the regulations formulated is questioned by the public
or the stakeholders of the companies due to recent corporate failures, especially
among Malaysian GLCs such as Sime Darby Berhad and Pos Malaysia Berhad. The
corporate failure has raised the issue of how can these companies fail as they are
well-regulated with updated regulation such as MCCG and IFRS. Are there other
factors that might overrule the endorsement of the rules?
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These cases have raised up the issue of companies’ transparency in terms of loss
recognition that can provide signals to the stakeholders to be wary and put pressures
on the firms to portray good quality of financial reporting.
Therefore, this study is conducted to examine the effect of recent regulations such as
MCCG 2007 and IFRS towards company’s financial reporting transparency by
examine the loss recognition measured by earnings conservatism and at the same
time try to explore other factors from Malaysia institutional setting that might
contribute to this corporate failure.
1.4 Research Questions
This study is carried out to answer the following research questions:
1. Does conservatism increase in the period after the adoption of IFRS?
2. Does conservatism increase in the period after the amendment of MCCG
2007?
3. Which corporate governance variables contribute to better financial reporting
quality?
4. What is the effect of institutional culture (i.e. political connection, family
ownership, elite connection and ethnicity) on the relationship between
regulations (i.e. IFRS and corporate governance) and conservatism.
1.5 Research Objectives
The objectives of this study are:
1. To examine whether the practice of conservatism increases in the period after
the adoption of IFRS.
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2. To examine whether the practice of conservatism increases in the period after
the amendment of MCCG 2007.
3. To investigate which corporate governance variables contribute to the
enhancement of financial reporting quality
4. To investigate the effect of institutional factors (i.e. political connection,
family ownership, elite connection and ethnicity) on the relationship between
regulations (i.e. IFRS and corporate governance) and conservatism.
Based on a final sample of 3,083 observations from listed companies in Bursa
Malaysia from year 2004 till 2009, we found strong evidence that financial reporting
quality is enhanced after adoption of IFRS and amendment of MCCG 2007 as we
find significant results that shows earnings conservatism is enhanced after the
reformation of the regulation. Our results are robust as we find that poorer financial
reporting quality measured by balance sheet conservatism is also reduced after the
reformation.
We extend the test to examine which corporate governance variables contribute to
the enhancement of financial reporting quality. Among the corporate governance
variables that contribute to the enhancement are board accountancy qualifications,
audit committee expertise and the number of audit committee meetings. We find
strong evidence that those variables also contribute to lower poor financial reporting
quality measured by balance sheet conservatism. Therefore, the results support
contracting theory.
Nevertheless, we found no evidence that board independence can enhance financial
reporting quality. Therefore, we extend the test to investigate whether financial
reporting quality in this country is influenced by its institutional setting which highly
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influenced by political connection, family dominance and economic inequality. Our
results indicate that Malaysia’s financial reporting quality is still influenced by its
institutional setting which is constructed on relationship-based economy and
economic inequality as we find strong evidence that earnings conservatism is
reduced for politically-connected firms and elite-connected firms. Overall, our study
finds that Malaysia’s financial reporting quality is still influenced by its institutional
setting, thus, supporting institutional theory.
1.6 Contribution of the study
The contributions of this study are as follows. Practically, this study will help the
regulators to formulate accounting policies, rules and standards that take into
consideration Malaysia’s institutional culture. Since Malaysia’s financial reporting
quality is significantly affected by culture (CLSA, 2010), this study will give input to
the regulators on its institutional culture that can be focused on. As Malaysia has
decided to move towards full convergence of IFRS in 2012, this study will provide
some input to the regulators to have a look at their decision and to conjure up certain
changes that might take place in the future.
For example, MFRS 124 Para 18 stated that if an entity has had related party
transactions during the periods covered by the financial statements, it needs to
disclose the nature of the related party relationship as well as information about those
transactions and outstanding balances, including commitments, necessary for users to
understand the potential effect of the relationship on the financial statements. In
addition, the standards also specify that disclosures shall also include s the amount of
the transactions, the amount of outstanding balances, including commitments, and
etc.
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Nevertheless, such requirement is exempted for government control entities. Para 25
states that a reporting entity that has control, joint control or significant influence
from the government is exempted from the disclosure requirements of paragraph 18
in relation to related party transactions and outstanding balances. The exclusion
should not exist if we want to promote financial reporting transparency.
There is no specific rule or code of corporate governance to date which is formulated
to consider the issue of family firms and politically connected firms. For example
more rules are needed to restrict the number of family directors or politically-
connected directors in composition of board of directors or otherwise all audit
committees in these types of companies should be independent. Such policies and
rules are very important since these types of firms are apparent in our country.
Ball et. al. (2000) state that financial opacity in emerging markets such as Malaysia
do not depend on the accounting system alone, but rather it depends on the role of the
regulators as a strong institution to enforce accounting rules. Regulators should play
their strict role to enforce legislation in the court system to ensure adequate
governance as has been practised by developed countries such as U.K. and U.S.
As for the government, this study can motivate them to improve their role in the
country’s business environment, especially their role in GLCs, to overcome these
companies’ failures in the future and, thus, can enhance the government’s credibility
in business environment. Since Malaysia place heavily on government and political
parties in business, the quality of government policies is a critical factor to ensure
that all those policies can benefit all citizens of Malaysia. The role of government is
needed to correct the market failure rather than for self-interests intervention as has
been practiced in developed countries.
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This study will stimulate stakeholders’ activism in Malaysia to protect their own
interest and actively play their role especially in annual general meetings as part of
the incentives for the firm to practice corporate transparency. CLSA report 2010
states that most firms in Malaysia continue to fail to have a meaningful dialogue with
theirshareholders. Even though these companies are open to answering questions
posed to themat AGMs, they will not consider voting by poll or even publish proxy
results.Not even one company in this country has voluntarily started voting by poll,
unlike in Thailand and Singapore (CLSA, 2010).
Theoretically, since conservatism is still a new concept in emerging countries, this
study can enhance awareness among Malaysia’s PLCs in understanding the concept
of conservatism as part of the financial reporting concept and financial reporting
quality measurement. This concept has always been misunderstood as a ‘pessimistic’
concept and, hence, will impede the firm’s growth. The public understanding of this
concept is also important in order to consider conservatism as part of the firms’
monitoring mechanism.
Secondly, this study aims to extend the existing literatures on importance of
conservatism as part of earnings quality measurements. Although many studies have
been done by using conservatism as earnings quality measurement, this study
highlights on its different roles by using both types of conservatisms which are
earnings and balance sheet conservatism which can provide a clearer understanding
on the concept and how it can help to promote good governance among public listed
companies.
Thirdly, this study brings in a new theory to the concept of conservatism which is
institutional theory. This theory has been used in this study since it is hypothesized
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that the quality of financial reporting in Malaysia is considerably influenced by its
institutional structure and social processes of the environment. The introduction of
this theory into the concept of conservatism also recognizes the importance of both
earnings and balance sheet conservatisms as both conservatisms are distinguished by
the institutional structure of a country.
1.7 Organizations of the Study
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the institutional
setting in Malaysia, focusing on regulations such as IFRS and MCCG, its political
economy and ethnicity. Chapter 3 summarizes the relevant past research on corporate
governance. The main hypotheses are developed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses
the research methods and sample profile with the empirical results provided in
Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises and concludes this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the background of financial reporting quality, regulation
development and institutional culture of Malaysia. Section 2.2 discusses the general
overview of financial reporting quality in Malaysia. It is followed by Section 2.3 and
2.4 which discuss Malaysia’s capital market and the regulatory regime in Malaysia
respectively. Then, this chapter discusses in detail the financial reporting system and
code of corporate governance in Malaysia in Section 2.5 and 2.6 respectively.
Section 2.7 discusses on the background of Malaysia’s two main institutional
cultures which consist of the country’s political economy and ethnicity. At the end
of the chapter, the whole background of Malaysia’s institutional setting is
summarized.
2.2 Financial Reporting Quality in Malaysia
CLSA Asia Pacific Market report on Malaysia’s overall performance in Corporate
Governance Watch 2007 states that:
“The quality of financial reporting among small listed companies is
poor, while the standards of non-financial reporting among
companies leave a lot to be desired. Few companies report their
audited annual results within 60 days. Securities laws do not appear
to provide a credible deterrent against insider trading. Legal
remedies for shareholders are limited. There is virtually no voting by
poll at AGMs. There is little confidence in the market that
independent directors are genuinely independent in Malaysia. While
public enforcement efforts have improved, regulators do not have the
reputation for treating companies and individuals equally. Indeed,
the consensus is that politic hampers the ability of regulators to do
their job properly. Private enforcement by the market is limited (at
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both the institutional and retail level), with many investors have a
low opinion of the ethical standards of the average listed company”
(CLSA, 2007, pg. 25)
Compared to other developing countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, the
quality of financial reporting in Malaysia is still low. A survey conducted by CFA
Institute for Financial Market Integrity 2004 Asia-Pacific Corporate and Financial
Disclosure Survey rated the quality of corporate and financial reporting in Malaysia
as average.5 The report of the survey revealed that the “average” rating for the
quality of corporate and financial disclosure given by respondents ranges from a low
of 28% in Australia to a high of 58% in Malaysia. In the meantime, a “good” rating
by respondents ranges from as low as 23% in Mainland China and Malaysia to as
high as 64% in Australia.
Consequently, one of the major criticisms on the lower quality of financial reporting
in Malaysia is lack of transparency. Thus, financial reporting transparency has been a
topic of debate in Malaysia since the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998. Weak
corporate transparency has been identified as one of the major factors behind the
crisis. Levitt (1998) stated that “The significance of transparent, timely and reliable
financial statements and its importance to investor protection has never been more
apparent. The current financial situations in Asia are stark examples of this new
reality. These markets learnt a painful lesson taught many times before: investors
panic as a result of unexpected or unquantifiable bad news”.
5CFA Institute is a global, non-profit professional association that administers the CFA curriculum
and examination program worldwide and, through its CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity, sets
voluntary, ethics-based professional and performance reporting standards for the investment industry.
From 1990 to early 2004, CFA Institute was known as AIMR (Association for Investment
Management and Research).
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Nevertheless, the results of the CFA survey, which were released in the second half
of 2005 generalized that the quality of corporate information released by listed
companies in the Asia-Pacific region is improving. The survey respondents agree
that the result is being driven by greater requirements from regulators. Executive
director of the CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity, Kurt Schacht concludes
that the disclosure practices and financial statement quality of companies, which also
includes their corporate governance practices, are critical information to investment
decision making (CFA Institute, 2005).
The improvement is seen to be greater when the CLSA Asia Pacific Market reports
on Malaysia’s overall performance in Corporate Governance Watch 2010 which
states that:
“The average CG score for Malaysian corporations at 55% is
slightly higher than regional average at 53%. Malaysian companies
do well particularly on transparency and independence as well as on
the C&G/CSR scores. Their main area of weaknesses in our scoring
is on accountability, viz the number of independent directors,
whether the audit committee appoints external auditors, voting by
poll, etc.”
(CLSA, 2010, pg. 91)
Recently, Malaysia has been doing well in their corporate governance rules and
practices. The CLSA Asia Pacific Market reports on Malaysia’s overall performance
in Corporate Governance Watch 2010 also noted that the most improved category for
Malaysian companies is on CGrules and practices with an increased score from 44%
in 2007 to 49% in 2010. Enforcement category has also been improved as SC has
been actively promoting good governance. The report revealed that regulators are
trying hard to better the system as the political and regulatory environment show
better improvement compared to 2007.
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In spite of that, Malaysia’s score for corporate governance culture dropped one
percent from 33% in 2007 to 32% in 2010. When comparing the governance score
between political and regulatory and CG culture of 11 capital markets in Asia, the
gap between these two scores is greatest in Malaysia which shows that CG culture
still poses a threat to the corporate governance practices here even though there is
improvement in the enforcement and regulatory system. Measuring CG culture based
on what companies, investors, intermediaries, non-profit organizations and what the
media are doing to raise CG standards voluntarily, CLSA (2010) reports that:
Malaysia retained its sixth spot in our rankings this year, but with a
higher overall score of 52% compared to 49% in 2007. Regulators
have been making steady progress in the past three years and
appear more open to listening to the market. Yet doubts remain. A
major issue we have is how much of this is window dressing and how
much is genuine change? Will this take corporate governance
practices beyond box-ticking? These uncertainties are why
Malaysia’s CG culture score recorded a one-percentage drop this
year, whereas all other categories saw improvement.
(CLSA, 2010, pg. 87)
2.3 Malaysia’s Capital Market
Malaysia’s capital market has been observed to have undergone significant
development since the financial crisis in 1997/1998. Ensuing the crisis, the regulators
have carried out various initiatives to improve market infrastructure and processes
and to reinforce the regulatory framework. This is done to enhance the role of capital
market in meeting investors’ preferences and to ascertain the effectiveness of
regulation in the changing market environment. In 2001, for example, the
MalaysianCapital Market Masterplan (CMP) was launched to boost the development
of the Malaysian corporate governance reform agenda. The CMP consists of 152
recommendations that deal with the development of institutional and regulatory
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framework for the capital market from 2001 to 2010. Ten of the recommendations
specifically address corporate governance with a focus on fair treatment of all
shareholders and protection of shareholder rights including minority shareholder
rights, transparency and disclosure, corporate ownership, accountability and
independence of the board of directors, regulatory enforcement, and training and
education (Malaysia Securities Commission, 2001).
Malaysian equity market is considered well developed if compared to most other
East Asian economies (Abdul Rahman, Mohd Sidek, & Tafri, 2009), whereas its debt
market is still developing (Lian, 2007). According to Ball, Robin &Sadka (2008),
there is a high demand for financial reporting in the debt markets and have highly
influence on the association between stock prices and earnings as presented by Ball
& Brown (1968).Therefore, they conclude that debt markets are primarily
responsible for accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism and earnings
timeliness is important in debt contracting as debt holders strongly depend on
financial statement variables to know their contractual rights. In contrast,
shareholders in the equity markets are able to get information of gains or losses
either from financial statements or other non-financial disclosure, as long as they
receive the information.
After the financial crisis of 2008, the equity capital market in Malaysia has
experienced significant growth with a steady rise in the number of listed companies
and the amount of funds acquired. Before the Asian financial crisis, there were a total
of 621 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (presently known as
Bursa Malaysia), which amounted to a total market capitalisation of RM806 billion
in 1996.However, during the crisis period in 1997 and 1998, a total of 708 and 736
